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Effects of  Ownership Restrictions on 
Farmland Values in Saskatchewan 
Jared G. Carlberg 
Restrictions or1  the ownership of tarrnland by  nonresidents of Saskatchcwan were i~l~posed 
by  the Farrnland Seci~rity  Act (FSA) in  1974. The FSA has been blamed by sorne observers 
for  depressed  provincial  land  valucs. AII adaptive  expectations  present  value  model  is 
developed to estimate the effects of the FSA, with the province of  Alberta included as  :I 
control. Results of seemingly unrelated regressions and generalized autoregressive condi- 
tional  heteroscedasticity estimates find no statistically significant effect of  the FSA on the 
value of  land in  Saskatchewan. This may  indicate that the effect of the regulatory change 
is  too small to he measured accurately. 
Kc.!  Worzls: adaptive expectations, Farrnland Security Act, generalized autoregressive con- 
ditional heteroscedasticity, present value, seemingly ~~nrelated  regressions 
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Limits to the ownership of domestic resourc- 
es by nonresidents are common. One example 
of such limits is those on foreign ownership 
of farmland.  Lapping  and Lecko note three 
main reasons for such ownership restrictions. 
First, foreign investors may have tax advan- 
tages that allow them to outbid local farmers 
for land. Second, nonresident owners may be 
more concerned with immediate profitability 
than  good  land stewardship. Third, absentee 
ownership may provide an unstable situation 
for a leasing farmer and could preclude farm 
expansion or rationalization  of exisling pro- 
duction  units.  The  Farmland  Security  Act 
(FSA) was enacted in  Saskatchewan in  1974 
in an effort to limit foreign ownership of that 
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province's agricultural land. The FSA severe- 
ly  restricts  the amount of  land  that  can be 
owned by nonresidents  of  Saskatchewan, 
with  Canadian  nonresidents  limited  to  320 
acres  and  forcign  nonresidents  confined  to 
half that amount. As such, the law has been 
cited as a possible cause of depressed provin- 
cial farmland values (Reginci Leuclrr-Post). It 
is  argued  that  if  the  number  of prospective 
bidders on a  parcel of farmland is  lowered, 
thc resulting pr-ice received by the vendor will 
also be lowered. resulting in a decrease in the 
wealth of farmers. 
The ob-jective of  the research  reported  in 
this paper is to determine the effect of the FSA 
on Saskatchewan land  values.  Two methods 
are used  to carry out  this  objective. First,  if 
the FSA  had an effect on Saskatchewan land 
prices, this shoulti be reflected in a significant 
durnmy  variable  representing  the  regulatory 
change. An econometric model that resembles 
previous models but incorporates the FSA as 
a  permanent  fundamental  component  of  the 
It~nd  price time series is constructed to test this hypothesis. A present value (PV) framework,' 
which calculates land values as the discounted 
surri of all future payments  to the land, is in- 
troduced  as the  null  hypothesis. The alterna- 
tive is an imperfect land market  in  which the 
number of  bidders affects the final price paid 
for land. Second, the ratio of the value of land 
in  Saskatchewan  to  that  in  the  neighboring 
province  of  Alberta  is  compared  before  and 
after the Act was implemented. If the FSA had 
the hypothesized negative effect. then the ratio 
of the value of Saskatchewan hi-inland to that 
of Alberta should have decreased after imple- 
mentation, ceteris paribus. 
Though several valuation studies have been 
carried  out  for  Canadian  farmland  (Baker, 
Ketchabaw,  and  Turvey:  Clark.  Klein.  and 
Thompson: Veeman, Dong, and Veemnn: Wei- 
sensel.  Schoney. and  Van  Kooten).  no previ- 
ous study  has  attempted to model  the effects 
of  land  ownership  restrictions.  If the number 
of potential nonresident land bidders is a sig- 
nificant  proportion  of  the  number  of  overall 
potential  bidders,  then  the  bid  price  for land 
should be lowered as a result of the ownership 
restriction.  Conversely, if  the  number of  po- 
tential  nonresident  land  buyers  is sufficiently 
low, no effect upon land values should be  ob- 
served. 
The contribution  of  the  paper  is twofcdd. 
The  immediate  contribution is  to the  current 
policy  debate  over  the  need  to  1-emove the 
FSA  to  protect  farm  wealth  from  further de- 
cline. If  no strong evidence is found  that  the 
FSA  has  caused farmland prices  to decrease, 
then calls for its removal may be without nier- 
it, at  least from  an  ecorio~nic  perspective. A 
longer-term  contribution  will  be  to augment 
the body of  literature on land valuation in gen- 
eral, by  introducing auclion theory as a fi-arne- 
work for demonstratiny the effects of reduced 
competition  in  land markets. 
Theory 
Melichar's  suggestion  that  the  PV  model 
would  be  an  appropriate  method  of  valuing 
farmland, numerous authors either accept (Al- 
ston; Burt: Pongtanakorn and Tweeten) or re- 
ject  (Chavas and Thomas: Clark, Fulton, and 
Scott: Falk:  Fentherstone  and Baker; Just and 
Miranowski:  Schmitz;  Tegene  and  Kuchler) 
the  model's  applicability  to agricultural  land 
in the United  States. In a previous paper, Falk 
and Lee decon~pose  farmland price tinie series 
into  three  uncorrelated  components-pernia- 
nent  fundamental.  temporary  fundamental, 
and nonfundamental-and  tind that deviations 
of  farmland price from  predictions of the PV 
modcl are not important in  the long run. 
The PV model is the framework of choice 
for  studies  of  Canadian  land  prices.  Baker, 
Ketchabaw, and Turvey use an augmented PV 
model to determine the extent to which capital 
gains exemption affects the bid pr-ice for land. 
Clark, Klein, and Thompson use a simple cap- 
italization formula to determine that subsidies 
are to a certain extent capitalized into land val- 
ues.  Veen~an: Dong,  and  Vee~nan explain 
farmland prices in terms of expected fr~rrnland 
earnings.  They  follow  Weisensel,  Schoney. 
and Van  Kooten in assrrting that expectations 
regarding  future  rents  are formulated  on  the 
basis  of  a  distributed  lag  structure  on  real 
earnings. Weersink et al. develop a PV moclel 
to  examine  the  extent  to  which  agricultural 
support  programs  have  been  capitalized  into 
farmland  prices.  Given  the  fiucliiigs  by  Falk 
and  Lee, 21nd noting that the PV  model  is the 
most widely  used for Canadian land valuation 
studies, that model is adopted here for [he per- 
fectly competitive case of  land price determi- 
nation. 
The PV  model  asserts  that  the  price  of  a 
parcel of land must be equal to the discounted 
sum of  its fut~~re  payments. This can be  rep- 
resented by the classic capitalization equatiur~: 
\ 
(I)  V,  =  R,,,/(I + d)'. 
,=I 
Little  consensus  exists  on  the  appropriate 
niethod of  determining farrnland value. Since  where  V,  is the value of the parcel of  land  at 
time period  t, R, is the payment (rent) to the 
1  The  v:,,ue  fralnework  is  also  frequently  parcel  of  land  in  tinie  period  t, d  is the dis- 
rct'erred  to as the  "income  capitalization"  model.  count rate,  ;issumed  in  this study  to be con- stant over time,  and  s is  the number uf  time 
periods forward from t over which discounting 
takes place. 
Expectations  play  a crucial role in  the  PV 
model. To  correctly price land, it  is necessary 
for buyers  and  sellers  to  forecast  the  rent  to 
that  land.  Weisensel.  Schoney. and  Van  Ko- 
oten, as well as Veeman. Dong, and Veeman, 
recognixe that because of  the uncertain nature 
of  commodity  prices  and  government  subsi- 
dies,  an assu~nption  of  rational  expectations 
regarding rents may be untenable. According- 
ly, both  sets of  authors use  adaptive expecta- 
tions to characterize the process by which buy- 
ers and  sellers  of  farmland  in Saskatchewan 
formulate  their  expectations  of  future  pay- 
ments to land. A similar framework for deter- 
mining rent expectations is adopted here. 
In  the  adaptive  expectations  framework, 
the  dependent  variable  is  determined  by  the 
expected, rather than current, values of the in- 
dependent variable  (Kennedy). Formally, this 
is written as: 
where RT  is the expected value of rent in time 
period  t, with expectations formed in  time pe- 
riod (t - l), and F, is the error term. Since the 
expected values are unknown.  a simple rule is 
used to formulate expectations on the basis of 
past  forecast errors. Specifically. the expected 
value of the independent variable is formed by 
taking  previous  period's  expected  value  and 
adding to it a constant prop or ti or^  of  the dif- 
ference between last period's  expected and re- 
alized values. This yields: 
Equation  (2) can  be  rearranged  to show that 
RI"  (Vr - p,, - c,)/P,; anal~go~~sly,  R,*:  = 
(V,-  , - p,, -  c-,  , )/PI. AS such, the lagged val- 
ue of rent depends on the lagged value of land 
value,  which  in  turn  depends on  the  lagged 
value of  rent. since expectations are formed in 
time period  (t - I), and so on. It is then nec- 
essary to detcrmine the appropriate lag length 
for land value and  rent in the adaptive expec- 
tations land value rilodel. 'The  tinal form of the 
model  consists of only  known  values  and  in- 
dicates that: 
where i and ,j are the lag lengths on land values 
and I-ents, respectively. 
Saskatchewan farmland is usually  sold via 
one of  two  auction  methods. The first is  the 
familiar oral auction-often  called the English 
auction-in  which the auctioneer begins with 
a given price, then decreases the amount asked 
~~ntil  a bid  is offered. Once a bid  is offered, 
participants then raise their bids until only one 
bidder remains. The winning bid is then slight- 
ly higher than the sccond-highest biclcler's  val- 
uation of the asset. The second and more con- 
mon  auction  n~ethod for  Saskatchewan 
farmland is the  first-price sealed  bid  auction. 
Irl  thi\  type of  auclion. b~ds  are  5ubmitted to 
the vendor  in  secret, with  no bidder aware of 
the ofters made  by  other bidders. The offers 
are opened at an appointed  date and the high- 
est bidder is awarded the parcel of  land at his 
bid  price. 
The  revenue-equivalence  theorem  asserts 
that in  a benchmark  model,  both  the English 
and  first-price  sealed-bid  auctions  yield  the 
same price  on  average  (Vickrey).'  However, 
the oral  auction  requires  the  presence of  the 
bidders.  If  it  is expensive or inconvenient for 
bidders  to  attend  the  auction,  their  number 
may  be  reduced  (Milgrom), and  the  winning 
bid may  be  lowered  sufficiently to more than 
offset the potential gains from an oral auction. 
This phenomenon may help explain the prev- 
alence  of  sealed-bid  auctions  in  the  sale  of 
Saskatchewan farmland. 
Regardless of  the  auction method  used,  it 
is a well-known empirical  result that the win- 
ning bid in  an auction varies directly with the 
number  of  participating  bidders  (Brannman, 
Klein,  and  Weiss;  McAfee  and  McMillan). 
This implies that if  the numbel- of  bidder5 on 
an  asset  is  restricted  by  regulation,  receipts 
from  the  auctio~~  of  that  asset  will  decrease, 
'The Dutch  and  seco~~d-price  scalecl-bid  auctions 
also yield  the same price as the English and first-price 
sealcd-hid auctions. ceteris pcrriD~t.s.  Since bidders submit bids that 
are  fur~ctions  of  their  valuations  of the  itern 
for  sale  (McAfee and  McMillali), regulatory 
exclusion of bidders for whom the asset to be 
auctioned has a higher value than the remain- 
ing bidders could lower bids even further. As 
noted  in the  introduction,  tax  advantages 
might be an example of a reason a nonresident 
bidder would assign a higher value to :in  asset 
such as farmland (Lapping and  Lecko). The 
use of land for recreational or other nonl'arnl- 
ing  purposes  could  be  another reason  that  a 
nonresident would  assign a higher value to a 
parcel  of  land  than  a  resident.  For example, 
land used fix a retirement hor~le  tilight be  val- 
ued  more  highly  than  a  similiu- parcel  used 
strictly for commodity production. 
Data 
The value of farmland is approximated by the 
"value  of land and buildings"  as reported by 
Statistics Canada's CANSIM service (matrices 
D202245  258  1.2 and  D209241  257  1.2 for 
Alberta and Saskatchewan, respectively). This 
is  reasonable  since the  value  of a  parcel  of 
land certainly  includes the value of the huild- 
ings located upon it. Since no reliable data ex- 
ists  for  cash  rents  paid  in  zithel- pt-ovince, 
"cash  receipts from farm products"  is used to 
approximate the rent paid to farmland (CAN- 
SIM  matrices  D200213  27  1  1.2.1  and 
D200204 270 1.2.1 for Alberta and Saskatch- 
ewan, respectively) for the period  1950-1 970, 
and "total  cash receipts"  is used for the period 
1 97  1 -  1999 (CANSIM rr~strices  D2  10662 27  1 
5  and  D210658  270 5  for  Alberta  and  Sas- 
katchewan, respectively).' Veeman. Dong, and 
Veeman chose total cash receipts to represent 
returns to farmland in their applicatiorl of the 
PV model to Canadian farmland. Both the val- 
ue  of  farmland and the rent series were con- 
' Statistics Canada changeti its methoti of reporting 
cash receipts to Ihrm  operators at that time. Since po- 
tential  bidders  on  a parcel  of  land  are aware ol. past 
Ireturns to that land, a change in  how those rctul-ns are 
measurcd by  a government agency will not affect their 
expectations.  unless  rtccornpanied by  a policy  change. 
Since the change applied to both. the ratio or Saskatcli- 
ewrrn  lo Alberta rents will  also not bc affected. 
verted to real price and real rent series by di- 
viding each series by the consumer price index 
( 1992  -  100)  (CANSIM  matrix  PI00000 
9940  I). Data  used are for the period  1950- 
1999. inclusive. 
Procedure 
Although  the effects of Saskatchewan's regu- 
latory change on land prices  in that province 
are the topic of interest in this paper. the pro\,- 
ince of Alberta is included as a control. Since 
Alberta  does not  restrict ownership of farm- 
land  by  Canadian residents of other provinc- 
es,'  land  values  in  that  province should not 
have been  measurably  affected by legislatiorl 
such as the FSA during the period of study. 
PV tnodels  of  land  valuation depend cru- 
cially  on  the hypothesis  that  land  prices and 
rents are stationary in their respective fir-st-dif- 
ferences  (Falk; Clark,  Fulton.  and  Scott). A 
Dickey-Fuller  test  can  be  used  to determine 
whether  a  time  series  is  first-difference sta- 
tionary. Consider the following rep]-esentation 
of land values and rents, respectively: 
(5,  AV, - 6 + yr  i  r,v,-,  + Lt,. 
(6)  AR, = (1)'  + y'r + T'V,  ,  + 11,. 
where AV, and AR, are first-ditferences in land 
values and I-ents,  respectively. and u, and v, are 
assumed to be white noise in the Dickey-Ful- 
ler test. The null hypothesis that the land value 
time series is stationary around a lineal- deter- 
ministic time trend  versus the alternative that 
the series is a  unit root with drift is then H,,: 
y  =  -q  = 0  vs.  H,,:  y  #  0  or  T i  0.  The 
analogous null  and alternative hypcltheses for 
rents are: H,,: y '  = 9'  = O  vs. H,,:  y' f 0 or 
9'  f 0. The Dickey-Fuller  test results are giv- 
en  in  Table  1. The results  indicate that both 
the  land  value and  rent  time  series for Sas- 
katchewan and Alberta are stationary  in tirst- 
Alberta,  like  Saskatchewan,  rcstl-ict\  ownership 
by  non-Canadian residents. However, it is assumed that 
thc  number of  prospective  non-C~in;ldian  land  buyers 
is  much  smaller than  the  nuinher  of  prospective  Cn- 
nadian  land buyers. Ccirlhc~rg:  Ej%,ct.r of'  Or~wershil~  K~.trricriorz,s  on Far 
Table  1.  Dickey-Fuller  Unit-Root  Tests  for 
Land Value and Rent Time Serie\, 1950- 1999 
Series  Saskatchewan  Alberta 
Land V1alue  -  1.54  -0.30 
Kent  -  1.33  -0.32 
Note\: Table  values are the  t-st;~ti\tic\  on the  laggecl tic- 
pmtlrnt variable  it1 Equations (5)  ant1 (6).  They are non- 
standard  and cannot he  corl~pared  against  the  standard  t 
critical  valites.  From  Gr-cene. thc critical  valuc  to re~ect 
thc null hypotl~chic  of tationnrity at  cu  = 0.05 is approx- 
irnalt.1~  -3.80. 
clifferences, a necessary  condition for the PV 
model to hold. 
Two methods are carried  out for determin- 
ing  whether  Saskatcheuan  land  values  were 
unaffected  by  the  FSA. The first  mcthocl  in- 
volves the calculation  of  a coefficient  on  the 
durnmy  variable  representing  the  FSA in  the 
adaptive expectations PV  moclel.  If  the  FSA 
affected  land  values  in  Saskatchewan but not 
Alberta. then the dummy variable representing 
the regulatory change should 11;rve a negative 
sign  and  be  statistically  significant  for  Sas- 
katchewan, but  not  for  Alberta. Equation  (3) 
suggests that  lag  lengths on both  land  values 
and  rents may  persist for a very  long time in 
the  adaptive  expectations  PV  land  model. 
Practically, these lag lengths must be truncated 
for  estimation  purposes.  The  si~nple  rule  of 
truncating  lags  at  the  point  where  further- 
lagged values are not statistically significant is 
used.  The  resulting  equations  for Saskatche- 
wan anti Alberta land values. respectively. are: 
where land value and rent variables are as pre- 
viously defined. FSA is the  indicator variable 
representing  the change in  regulation, and  cv,, 
and  rl,,,,  are the error terms. 
If  two  separate equations  are  affected  by 
common  factors  that  influence  their  distur- 
bances. it may be appropriate to treat the equa- 
tions  as a  set rather than  separately  (Johnson 
and  DiNardo). Pongcanakorn and Tweeten in- 
cluded  nurnerou\  tactor5 that exert minor in- 
fluence  on  the  price  of  Inntl,  and  thu5  could 
affect  the d14turbance term\  in  the equation\ 
for land \slues in  both Sa4hatchewan and Al- 
berta.'  One  method  for  e4tlmation  of  \uch  a 
set of equations-if  there are no dependent re- 
gressors-is  seemingly  unrelated  regressions 
(SUR). As the name denotes, the ecluations in 
a  SUR  system seen1  to  be  unrelated  but  are 
related through their disturbance tcrnis. By es- 
timating the equations as a set rather than  in- 
dividually, the efficiency  of  the estimate can 
be enhanced by  taking the cross-equation cor- 
relations into account. 
Before  SUK can  be  performed,  it is  nec- 
essary to determine whether the error terms of 
the equations  follow any  autoregressive pro- 
ccss. If  autocorrelation  is  present  in  a model 
and not addressed, parameter estimates will be 
inefficient  and  statistical  tests  will  be  biased. 
Further,  thc  presence  of'  autocorrelation  in  a 
framework  such as the  adaptive expectations 
PV  land  model, with  a lagged dependent var- 
iable, causes all desirable estimator properties 
to be lost. If the residual of a regression eclua- 
tion in  time period t is given by e,. then testing 
for first-order ;rutocorrelation involves testing 
H,,: p  = 0 in the equation: 
Higher-or-dcr autocorrelation of  an  analogous 
form can also exist. Testing for ~lutocorrelation 
i~sually  is done with  a Durbin-Watson  cl-test, 
but that method cannot be used in the adaptive 
expectations PV model because it includes one 
or more laggccl dependent variables as regres- 
sors. Accordingly.  the Durbin-/I test is used  in 
this  paper;  and  indicates  that  autocorrelation 
exists for residuals in  both  the  Saskatchewan 
and  Alberta  equations." Stepwise autoregres- 
sion is then used to determine the order of the 
autoregressive ~nodel  for the equations. and  it 
is concluded that the equations for both pro\!- 
;  Pongtanakot-n :rnd Twcetrn list factors such as in 
tercst  rates  on farm  loans,  population  density.  htock 
~narket  return\. and others. 
"The sire of  all ~nisspecification  tests in this papcr 
was chosen to he 5% 1  05 
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Figure 1.  Ratio of  Saskatchewan Land Val-  Figure  2.  Ratio of  Saskatchewan Cash Re- 
ue to Alberta Land Value  ceipts to Alberta Cash Receipts 
inces  follow a  first-order autol-egressice error 
model. 
The MODEL procedure in SAS allows for 
the estimation of  a SUR system with autocor- 
relation.  and  is  used  to estimate equations 7 
and 8 in double-log form, incorporating a first- 
order autoregressive error structure. The Sha- 
piro-Wilk  W  test  statistics  for Saskatchewan 
and  Alberta  are 0.97  and  0.98,  respectively, 
with  p-values of  0.46 and 0.83. As such, the 
null  hypothesis  of  normality  is  not  rejected. 
Analogously,  a  Henze-Zirkler  T-test statistic 
of  1.28 with a  p-value of  0.20 indicates that 
normality is  not rejected for the SUR system 
as a  whole.  Godfrey's  test  statistic for serial 
correlation is 0.48 with  a  p-value of  0.45 for 
Saskatchewan anri  1.30 with a p-\~aluc  of 0.25 
for Alberta, indicating that seri:~l  correlation is 
not present in the residuals of either equation. 
Additionally. a Chow test for structural change 
is  conducted; the  P-value  is  0.67  with  a  p- 
value of 0.78. indicating that the null hypoth- 
csis of no structural change as a result of the 
FSA is not rejected. 
A modified Breusch-Pagan  test is selectrd 
to  check  for  ho~noscedasticity of  the  error 
terms. White's test is not used because it may 
identify  specification  errol-s other than  hetet-= 
oscedasticity beca~ise  of its general form (SAS 
Institute,  Inc.).  The  null  hypothesis  of  the 
modified Breush-Pagan  test is H,,: cr',  = tr2(8,, 
+ 8,  'z,) vs. H,A:  tr',  f u2(6,,  + 8,  'z,), where u', 
is the error variance of  each observation and 
z, is  :I  vector of  values for observation i for 
the variables that  are thought  to be possible 
causes of heteroscedasticity.  Using the full set 
of regressors for zi,  the test statistics for Sas- 
katchewan and Alberta are 8.87 and 8.38 with 
p-values  of  0.45  and  0.49, respectively.  As 
such, the null  hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
is not re.jected  for either equation. 
The second method  of  estimating the ef- 
fects of the FSA considers the ratio of  Sas- 
katchewan land values to Alberta land values. 
Figure  1  plots that ratio for thc period  1950- 
1999,  and  suggests  that  the  ratio  changed 
around the time the legislation came into ef- 
fect. If the FSA did not affect Saskatchewan 
land values, the land value ratio should have 
remained approximately constant, unless oth- 
cr fiictors also changed. As noted above. the 
primary  determinant  of  land  values  is  rent 
earned by the land. Fig~~re  2  shows that the 
ratio  of  Saskatchewan  to  Alberta  cash  re- 
ceipts exhibits the same general trend as does 
the  ratio of  land  values.  Ti'  the ratio of land 
values  in the two PI-ovinces is considered to 
be a function of  the ratio of cash receipts and 
the imposition uf land ownership restrictions 
in Saskatchewan, the following model can be 
estimated: 
where  V,S  and  VP  ate the  value  of  land  and 
buildings in Sa\katchewan and Alberta, respec- 
tively,  R:  and K:  are the  analogous variables 
for rent, and (,  is the error term. To  determine C'trr-lhrq: cffi.c.r.c  of'  Oivrwr:\.hip Rc.ctric.tions on For'~n??lrr~ld  C'crlrlrs  355 
Table 2.  Para~neter  Estimates fro111 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions for Value of  Land and 
Buildings, Saskatchewan and Alberta.  1952-1 999 
Variable  SaAatchen an  A1 berta 
Intercept  0.204  (0.202)  0.236  (0.15 1 ) 
Land  Value.  Lagged One Pe~iod  l.h231 (0.098)  I .476-  (0.085) 
Land  Valr~e.  Lagged  Two Pcriods  O.692* (0.09  1 )  -0.595*.  (0.077) 
Rent 
Rent, Lagged One Period 
Farmland Sccurl ty  Act  0.036  (0.054)  0.048  (0.044) 
Adjustccl  R? 
N 
Notes: Standard crrors are given in parentheses. An asterisk  indicate.; signiticancc at the 5%  le\~el 
whethet  the  FSA  affected  Saskatchewan land 
values, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
(11)  H,,:a, = Ovs. H,: a, f 0. 
Equation  (10) is  estimated  using  ordinary 
least  squares. A  Durbin-Watson  cl-test rejects 
the null hypothesis of  no autocorrelation in the 
residuals. Stepwise autoregression indicates 
that  a  first-order  autorcgrcssive process  is  an 
appropriate representation of the error terms. A 
Q-statistic test rejects thc r~ull  hypothesis of ho- 
moscedasticity, as does a  Lagrange multipliet- 
(LM) test. 
The generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity  (GARCH)  model  is  one 
method  for  addressing  heteroscedasticity  in 
time  series  models.  The GARCH  model  al- 
lows long memory processes, which is appro- 
priate  in  this case sir~ce  the Lhl  tests for he[- 
eroscedasticity  are significant at long  lag 
lengths. It is possible  to  combine an  AR(nll 
proces\ with a GARCH(j,,(/)  process to mc~del 
a  time  series  with  an  autol-egressive  error 
structure involving hctet-oscedasticity. In  most 
cases, a GARCH(  I,  I ) model is appropriate for 
estimation: this type of GARCH model com- 
bined with an AR(1) model is used in  this pa- 
per. Estimates are calculated using the method 
of maximurn likelihood. 
Results 
Equations  (7) and  (8). The dunlmy  variable 
representing the  FSA  is  not  statistically  sig- 
nificant  for  either  Saskatchewan  or  Alberta, 
and  does  not  have  the  expected  sign  in  the 
Saskatchewan case. The magnitude of the FSA 
variable  is  larger  for  Albcrta  than  fr)l- Sas- 
katchewan,  3s  expected.'  Equality  of  coeffi- 
cients on that vat.iable for the respective prov- 
inces  is  tested  with  a  Wald  test  and  not 
rejected, indicating that the effect of the FSA 
on land  values  in  Sas1;atchewan  is not statis- 
tically different from that in  Alberta. 
The coefficient on the dummy variable rep- 
resenting the legislation for the Saskatchewan 
model  is 0.036. Given a mean  on the depen- 
dent  variable  (the  logarithm of  the  value of 
land  and  buildings)  of  13.727 and  dividing. 
the  FSA  can  be  interpreted  as generating  a 
0.24% increase  in  Saskatchewan land  values. 
This translates  into an  increase of $19.2 mil- 
lion, on the basis of the average value of land 
and buildings in the province. For Alberta, the 
coefficient  for the  FSA is 0.048, which  is  a 
0.33%) increase in  the value of land and build- 
ings given a  mean  dependent variable in  Al- 
berta  of  14.765. The  magnitude  of  the  "ef- 
fect" of the FSA in Alberta is, therefore, $3 1.9 
million-though  of  course this  "effect"  can- 
not be attributed  to the FSA, which  was not 
in  place in  Alberta. 
If  it  were assurned  that  the  value  of land 
and  buildings  in  Saskatchewan  would  have 
Table 2 gives the results of SUR estimation of  The  nlapnitude of  the  FSA durnnjy  variable  was 
the  adaptive expectations PV  land  model  for  expected  to  be  significantly  rlegative  in the  sask3tch- 
Saskaichc\van  and  Alberta  as represented  by  cwan case and close to zero tor Albcrta. Table 3.  Parameter Estimates from General-  nioval  of the FSA are without  merit, because 
ized  Autoregre\sive  Conditional  Heteroske-  they  are  unnecessary  from  an economic per- 
dasticity Model, for Ratlo of Saskatchewan to  spective.  Claim\  that  farm  wealth  is  dimin- 
Alherta  Value  of  Land and  Buildings,  1950-  i~hed  by  lower  land  values  due to  the  FSA 
1999  cannot  be substantiated  by  the  evidence dis- 
Vr:lriable  Eatirnaie  covered here. 
lrltcrcept  0.898*  Summary and Conclusions 
(0.1  17) 
Ratio of- Saskatchewarl  0.2  133: 
(0.052)  The objective of the research reported in  this  to  Alberta Cash Receipts 
Farm  Security Act  0.042  paper was to determine the effect of the FSA 
(0.073)  (1974) on land values in  Saskatchewan. That 
N  = 50  legislation  introduced  restrictions on  the 
Norrb: Stantlard crrors are gi\en in parerlthe~es.  A11  ;ister- 
isk  indicates significance ;it  the 5% level. 
changed by  the same propor-tion as in Albcrta 
because  of  the  FSA-that  is,  if  the  same 
0.33% increase in  land values would have oc- 
curred  in  Saskatchewan as  in Alberta  in  ab- 
sence of  the  legislation-then  an  estimate of 
the  FSKs effect can  be calculated. Saskatch- 
ewan's  land values increased 0.09% less than 
did  Alberta's  as  a  result  of  the  FSh.  This 
translates  into an  effect  of  the  FSA  for Sus- 
katchewan  as  a  whole  of  approximately 
$493.000.  On  the basis of  21  real  mean  value 
of land and buildings in the province of nearly 
$9 billion, this effect is not  very large. 
Table  3  shows  the  GARCH  model  esti- 
mates for Equation  (10). The null  hypothesis 
presented  in  Equation  (I  l  )  is  tested  and  not 
rejected, indicating that the FSA did not have 
a statistically significant effect  on the I-atio  of 
Saskatchewan  to  Alberta  land  values.  As  in 
the SUR model, the expected sign on the dum- 
my  is  not  obtained.  In  fact.  a  coefticien~  of 
0.042 on the dummy variable representing the 
FSA implies that the ratio of the value of land 
and builrlings in  Saskatchewan relative to that 
in  Alberta  increased  rather than decreased as 
a result  of the  legislation. 
Results  of  both  methods  for  determining 
the effects of  the FSA on  land  values in  Sns- 
katchewan  indicate that the impact of the Ieg- 
islation  is  negligible.  No evidence  is  found 
that the FSA lowered the value of  farmland in 
Saskatchewan relative to the control pro\'  '~nce 
of  Alberta. This rn:iy  mean  that  calls  for re- 
amount of  land  that can  be  owned  by  indi- 
vidual  non-Saskatchewan  residents. Auction 
theory  asserts that  such  restrictions  on asset 
ownership, which lower the number of  com- 
peting  bidders,  should  result  in  decreased 
prices for the asset. An adaptive-expectations 
PV model for land PI-ices  was developed and 
estimated  for  the  period  1952-1999  with 
SUR for the provinces of  Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, the  latter of which was  included  as 
a  control.  A  GARCH  rnodel,  which  allows 
heteroscedasticity  to be  addressed  in  a time- 
series framework including autoregressive er- 
ror terms.  was  used  to  estimate an equation 
for the ratio of Saskatchewan to Alberta land 
values for the period  1950-1 999. Results in- 
dicated  that  the effect of  the  legislation was 
not significant, amounting to less than  half  a 
rnillion  dollars at most for- Saskatchewan. 
This study fvund no evidence that the FSA 
caused  land  values  in  Saskatchewan  to  de- 
crease. As  such.  there  may  be  little need  for 
its removal. In  fact. it could be argued that thc 
legislation  is efticient in  the sense that  it has 
not caused econoniic loss while possibly help- 
ing to acconiplish the goals of  mitigating  the 
possible  tax  advantages  of  nonresidents,  en- 
suring good land stewardship, ancl providing a 
stable environment for local  lessees. 
The  results  of  this  study  are  subject  to 
some considerable limitations. Better data may 
have Icd  to  inore precise  results frclni  the re- 
search. The data for cash receipts and the val- 
ue of  land  and buildings  are highly aggregat- 
ed, making the effect of the FSA on individual 
land  transactions  difficult  to  discover:  Addi- 
tionally. one would desire ;I  better measure ol' cash rents to farmers than the use of cash re- 
ceipts  provides,  though  cash  receipts  have 
been  used  in a Canadian land valuc study by 
Veeman,  Dong, and Veeman and is the only 
reliablt: approximatiol~  available. As  well, hav- 
ing  only 50  observations in  the  time  series 
limits  the  ability  to  draw  strong  inferences 
from the results of the study. 
One of  the most important  contributions 
of  the paper was its application of topics from 
auction theory into the study of  the effects of 
ownership restrictions on land values. That a 
lower number of bidders decreases thc price 
paid at auction f'or an asset is well-established 
empirically.  IS transaction-specific data were 
available.  r-r~ore  precise  results coilld be ob- 
tained.  One possible  avenue of  research  in 
this area involves ctildying  a  specific region 
of  the  province  before  and  after  the  FSA 
came into effect. However. the task of  gath- 
ering credible data for such  research would 
be onerous. 
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